Both Mr. John and Mr. Matthew have shared some very important links on their respective blogs that I really needed to share.
First of all, Mr. John explores the hypocrisy of the American "right" when he shares his finds concerning stay-at-home moms. In a nutshell, the issue is economic, not ideological. From what I see, even feminist mothers find themselves preferring to stay at home with the little ones... if they can afford it. But the real kicker comes from so-called "social conservatives" who preach about family values and in the same breath defend deregulation, union busting, for-profit corporate culture, and libertarian capitalism, all of which had nothing to do with their model society of the 1950's. Any progressive who claims that Ann Romney never worked a day in her life is out of line; being a parent is one the hardest jobs there is as it is 24/7, no pay, and never a thank you. Any conservative who calls "war on mothers" are also delusional as it their economic agenda that is hurting families.
Mr. Matthew's finds go into the current situation in Libya, now that the freer and democratic National Transitional Council is in power. Such accomplishments have made under this new "democratic" regime; they could have very well have scored a body count that even Gaddafi could never match. It is another testament to the necessity of military intervention and the spread of freedom that follows. The freedom to commit genocide, the freedom to make mass graves, the freedom to wrongfully imprison the supporters of the previous regime.
Enough sarcasm. Gaddafi was not a saint by a long shot. This does not mean that people rebelling against him are saints themselves. Remember that the term "revolution" implies a 360 degree rotation, and when that is complete you are back to where you started. And in spite of what American history books say, the end result of a revolution is often something worse. Case in point Libya. Case in point Iraq and especially Afghanistan. In all three of these countries Western intervention and overthrow of the repressive regime improved nothing. We see rising sectarian violence and the rise of extremist ideologies, never mind an increase of corruption (Iraq and Afghanistan are already on par with Myanmar and only one step below Somalia).
It is important to know that this is the rule of interventionism and revolution. We must accept this to stop NATO or even just the US from doing it again in the remaining hot spots of Syria and Bahrain. Already BBC, PBS, and Democracy NOW (the last of which I have absolutely ZERO love for) among others are trying to rouse up support for intervention with all this talk of "these poor people are so helpless" without even asking what they want when their oppressors are booted.
As for Libya, many Cyrenacians (eastern Libya) now say they want to secede, with a member of the Senussi Royal Family being the leader of that movement. I will keep an eye on this to see what happens and keep my fingers crossed while I hope things get better. "If" things get better.
Sunday, May 27, 2012
Monday, May 14, 2012
Prince of Greece Speaks Out
Crown Prince Pavlos of the Hellenes gives his input on the crisis in Greece and the recent election. (A thanks to the Radical Royalist for the link) Yes, the recent election in which the republican government banned all monarchist parties from participating in, and that saw the rise of extremist factions such as communists and neo-nazis.
Poor Greeks... they really need strong guidance during this troubled time, but in 1974 they decided to eject their royals and give political parties and their plutocrat leash holders the chance to establish their Power Elite. The Greeks wanted a republic, this is what happens in one. The only winners in the 1974 plebiscite were the plutocratic successors of the Regime of Colonels. And now... after decades of duopoly rule... the people decide to turn to radicals to break the Power Elite. "Out of the frying pan, into the fire"? Which one would be the fire?
Hey Greeks... any regrets?
Anyway, enough from me... have a look.
Saturday, April 21, 2012
The Legacy of Emperor Meiji
Mr. John has shared on his blog a link to a very important discussion concerning how the Meiji Restoration was so successful... uh, for Japan, that is, not for the western "free market". Really, what libertarians, free trade and free market proponents fail at is defining what they mean by "free". Something you will learn at the link.
Meiji's intervention on behalf of his people is what very well could have preserved his dynasty and saved Japan. If only Imperial China could have been saved the same way...
I leave you with the final scene of The Last Samurai, with Japanese actor Nakamura Shichinosuke II as the Emperor Meiji. Here he finds his backbone and puts the gaijin and his bureaucrats in their place. Of course, an American sympathizer (Tom Cruise) had to help with that. That's Hollywood for you.
Meiji's intervention on behalf of his people is what very well could have preserved his dynasty and saved Japan. If only Imperial China could have been saved the same way...
I leave you with the final scene of The Last Samurai, with Japanese actor Nakamura Shichinosuke II as the Emperor Meiji. Here he finds his backbone and puts the gaijin and his bureaucrats in their place. Of course, an American sympathizer (Tom Cruise) had to help with that. That's Hollywood for you.
Monday, April 9, 2012
Real China is Endangered
Matthew Franklin Cooper has made an excellent find concerning Chinese recent efforts to preserve their culture against the conformity of so-called "progress". Take a look.
Sunday, April 8, 2012
"No Labels" Means "No Labels"
A few weeks back on the Colbert Report, viewers got to learn of an organization known as "No Labels". Supposedly, this political group is meant to find common ground, maintain civility, and discover "bi-partisan" solutions to get our government working again.
It should be no secret (unless you are a recent follower to my blog, in which case, welcome aboard and enjoy your stay) that I believe that political labels are utterly useless. I think that you should use your own smarts and decide what is right for you and for society rather than taking a label and filtering your own beliefs through it. Make no mistake, this is what we have right now, with everyone being a conformist and eating up everything they are told by their political masters (whether from cable news, or a candidate for office); after all, the only definitions labels have are whatever the most influential say. I personally refuse to call myself anything other than what you see under my blog name; I even disagree to place myself on the narrow-minded left-right spectrum. If left and right are all there are, then how is the "center" defined? One unfortunate fact I find in American politics is that any label of moderate/centrist/balanced or of the like are usually synonymous with libertarian, a term which is itself defined by the social darwinism of Ayn Rand and so called "moderate" Republicans.
It's okay to call yourself something, as long as you retain your own beliefs about what you are and not be a conformist to trends.
As for "bi-partisan", this term is very counterproductive and limiting. Using this term implies that anyone trying to draw the best policy must think within the boundaries of American political definitions. It is important to remember that this is fruitless as the big two parties mostly believe in the same ideas with minor variations: neoliberalism or any form of unlimited capitalism, republicanism, and jingoism. It is important for No Labels to understand that in order to truly look beyond labels members need to drop all of them, whether it is party affiliation, ideology, or simply "bi-partisan". Real change and solutions can only come from looking outside the same tried and failed American political schemes. I hope No Labels understands this... maybe they already do?
It should be no secret (unless you are a recent follower to my blog, in which case, welcome aboard and enjoy your stay) that I believe that political labels are utterly useless. I think that you should use your own smarts and decide what is right for you and for society rather than taking a label and filtering your own beliefs through it. Make no mistake, this is what we have right now, with everyone being a conformist and eating up everything they are told by their political masters (whether from cable news, or a candidate for office); after all, the only definitions labels have are whatever the most influential say. I personally refuse to call myself anything other than what you see under my blog name; I even disagree to place myself on the narrow-minded left-right spectrum. If left and right are all there are, then how is the "center" defined? One unfortunate fact I find in American politics is that any label of moderate/centrist/balanced or of the like are usually synonymous with libertarian, a term which is itself defined by the social darwinism of Ayn Rand and so called "moderate" Republicans.
It's okay to call yourself something, as long as you retain your own beliefs about what you are and not be a conformist to trends.
As for "bi-partisan", this term is very counterproductive and limiting. Using this term implies that anyone trying to draw the best policy must think within the boundaries of American political definitions. It is important to remember that this is fruitless as the big two parties mostly believe in the same ideas with minor variations: neoliberalism or any form of unlimited capitalism, republicanism, and jingoism. It is important for No Labels to understand that in order to truly look beyond labels members need to drop all of them, whether it is party affiliation, ideology, or simply "bi-partisan". Real change and solutions can only come from looking outside the same tried and failed American political schemes. I hope No Labels understands this... maybe they already do?
Sunday, March 25, 2012
(Much Needed) Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan
Mr. John has shared a most vital link to an essay by Dr. Stephen Walt over at Foreignpolicy.com that explains 10 needed lessons that the US must learn from the mayhem that was the Iraq War. It is something you absolutely must see for yourself.
What is also necessary to learn are lessons from the debacle in Afghanistan. To that end, I would like to make a contribution: my own term paper from when I was an undergrad, assessing the tactical and strategic situations there from 2001 to the present (which was 2011 when I did this). Each paragraph tackles a different topic, from US used tactics on the battlefield, to Afghanistan's background, to modern history, to NATO goals and accomplishments, to current problems facing the country. I'm no Dr. Walt and by no means a professional analyst, so by all means blow all of this off if you think I'm full of it. I don't know why you would be reading my blog if you thought I was, though.
Oh, and this was written right before Bin Laden was supposedly wasted, so expect inaccuracies.
(Bold italics in parenthesis are comments I am adding right here on the blog.)
" Whenever any policymaker considers any type of operation in Afghanistan, it is important to know that the nation has a lot of attributes that contribute to instability: The people of the country are ethnically and linguistically divided, there is a history of struggle against European influence that lasted about one hundred years (and included three wars), drug trafficking is a major problem, and the country has been in civil war since the failed Soviet invasion. It really appears that nothing seems to go right for Afghanistan. There are even signs of struggle from the United States military. It has been almost ten years since Operation EnduringFreedom was launched, and since then there have been plenty of raids, military offensives by both US military and Taliban insurgents, tension involving neighboring nations (namely Pakistan), and American troop surges. Things do not appear to be any more stable than when Western involvement in Afghanistan began; insurgency is still a problem, the deposed Taliban is still determined as ever, opium trafficking is rampant, local support is falling, and the American-backed regime is a hot bed of corruption. This essay will examine topics ranging from the cultural and political environment of Afghanistan, US policy during the Soviet invasion, earlyUS objectives and tactical analysis during Operation Enduring Freedom, the increase of insurgency and US response (NATO involvement, troop surges, etc.), the background of insurgent forces and other threats, to what (if anything) can be done to see improvement.
Afghanistan has a gloomy background that builds upon its instability and militant culture, and this is something policymakers need to consider, no matter the operation. The ethnic makeup is very diverse, with Pashtuns making up the majority with forty-two percent of the population, Tajiks taking up twenty-seven percent, Hazaras and Uzbeks having nine percent each, and Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch and other minorities filling in the remaining thirteen percent. Language is also very divided; though there is plenty of multilingualism, a fifty percent majority speak Dari Persian with Pashto speakers taking thirty-five percent of the population. <"The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed March 1, 2011).> The Pashtuns in particular, who mostly inhabit the western and southern regions of the county, have a brutal history of war and resisting outsiders. The country’s location has attracted the eye of many foreign invaders; being right in the middle of the Asian continent, it is something of a crossroads in between India, the Middle East, East Asia, and Russia along with the former Soviet republics. Therefore, it is a land of strategic importance to anyone trying to obtain dominance in Asia. For virtually all the 19th Century, Russia and Great Britain - while competing for control in Central Asia - kept Afghanistan under influence in a period known as “The Great Game”. This lasted until the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, when Afghanistan finally gained political sovereignty. While Afghanistan has not had an easy road to independence, the Pashtuns have always been fierce in resistance. With every invader, they have always put up a fight and learned to adapt against any outside threat, and are unlikely to tolerate foreign presence in their lands as a result of all the bloody imperialist history. <Afsar, Shahid, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood. "The Taliban, An Organizational Analysis." Military Review (2008): 59>
In 1979, the Soviet Union sent armed forces into Afghanistan to aid the communist state in power at the time against the mujahideen, who were determined to impose their strict religious values. The United States responded to this by sending aid to the insurgents, including lots of money and weapons purchased from China. The Soviets could not overcome the American supplied and financed insurgents, and withdrew from Afghanistan, their campaign a failure. After driving out the Soviets, the communist regime in Kabul was then overthrown and replaced with a weak republican government. Without strong leadership and the tribal factions remaining divided, the country plunged deeper into civil war. The US, however, cut off most rebuilding aid by 1989, leaving Afghanistan a ruined country with people in poverty and fighters who were still
armed. A few years later, many of the US-backed mujahideen joined with fundamentalist forces to establish the Taliban, which overthrew the weak republic and took power as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Much of what the US had given the Afghans had become assets for the Taliban to pursue their militant Islamic agenda. The Pashtuns, seeing an ideology that would be a strong preserver of their Islamic way of life, found the Taliban to be promising, and thus became the majority group of the movement. <Afsar 60> The weak central leadership that has plagued Afghanistan for decades was finally filled by the Taliban, and that sign of unity appealed to more mujahideen and tribes, who began to align with the Emirate in greater numbers. The extremist regime was terrorist-friendly enough to become a safe haven for other Islamic militants, including Osama Bin Laden. <“Terrorism - Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy." CDI - Center for Defense Information - Security Policy Research Organization. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm (accessed March 2, 2011).> Bin Laden and his terrorist organization al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a vital resource: “Bin Laden appeared to have in Afghanistan a freedom of movement that he had lacked in Sudan. Al Qaeda members could travel freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any information procedures, purchase and import vehicles and weapons, and enjoy the use of official Afghan Ministry of Defense license plates.” <The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004. 66> In time, enough pieces were in place to allow Bin Laden to pull off the fateful terrorist attack in New York City on September 11th, 2001. After this attack, Washington responds accordingly with Operation Enduring Freedom.
In preparing for action against al Qaeda, President George W. Bush gathered his “War Council” and formulated the public policy on what to do: to attack terrorism around the world, as well as any nations who harbor them. What this meant for Afghanistan is that the ruling Taliban would be held accountable for aiding al Qaeda, and would come under fire as well. US strategy in Afghanistan also included diplomacy; Afghanistan neighbor Pakistan was known to support the Taliban, but not al Qaeda. A list of steps to assist US operations was given to the Pakistani government, including to allow the US usage of Pakistani territory, publicly denouncing terrorism, and stopping supply shipments to Afghsnitan. Pakistan agreed to all demands, as the alternative was to become another suspect in supporting terrorism. <Commission report 331> With Pakistan’s cooperation, President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began discussing what to do with the Taliban. The policy that was formulated (with help from the State Department), would put pressure on the Taliban to fold to US demands; the leaders of Afghanistan would be given a range from twenty-four to forty-eight hours to turn over Bin Laden and his lieutenants to the US as well as “[to] tell the United States what the Taliban knew about al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply with UN Security Council resolutions.” Policymakers did not expect the Taliban to fold. <332> Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet proposed using the CIA to work with anti-Taliban warlords to enlist their help in fighting al Qaeda, and military officials drew up a campaign strategy based on the Pentagon’s “phased campaign” plan. Rumsfeld was tasked with ensuring American soldiers worldwide were safe from terrorist attacks, and the Treasury Department was to go after al Qaeda’s financial assets. By September 18, Powell found that there was enough international support for the US, with allies pledging aid in the form of medical services and search-and-rescue. The final draft of the anti-terrorist policy, titled “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States”, included Bush’s proposal to count terrorist harboring nations as terrorists themselves and expanded strategy to become a worldwide “War on Terror”, not simply action against al Qaeda. The policy made it clear that “The United States would strive to eliminate all terrorist networks, dry up their financial support, and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” <333-334>
Operation Enduring Freedom was divided into four phases: In Phase One, American forces would move into the region around Afghanistan (such as neighboring countries) and begin to organize and plan attacks. Phase Two was when the CIA and Special Operations forces began working with anti-Taliban warlords, while air attacks were done against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. Phase Three saw the use of American ground forces in Afghanistan and active effort to overthrow the Taliban. By mid November, the Taliban abandoned Kabul to American and anti-Taliban Afghan forces, and by December all major cities were liberated. One of the main perpetrators of the 9/11 attack, Mohammed Atef, was killed in an air strike. Tora Bora, an important stronghold and cave network to al Qaeda, was cleared of all threats and captured as well (although Bin Laden was not captured). Finally, after a three week battle against al Qaeda, most militants fled into the mountains of Pakistan. The success was so rapid that it took less than a year to happen. Mutual cooperation with local forces is clearly a factor to the rapid success, as “... the CIA provided intelligence, experience, cash, covert action capabilities, and entree to tribal allies. In turn, the US military offered combat expertise, firepower, logistics, and communications.” However, work was not done; the fourth and final phase of the Coalition invasion was to redirect efforts for “security and stability operations.” <337-338> With the Taliban out of power, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The political body responsible for creating domestic policy, the loya jirga (Pashto for “great council), selected Hamid Karzai as leader, despite the council’s consensus of restoring the monarchy deposed in 1978. (American pressure stopped restoration) <Dorronsoro, Gilles. "Return to Political Fragmentation." In Revolution Unending: Afghanistan:1979 to the present. London: Columbia University Press, 2005. 330.> The new democratic regime was supposed to be ideal to promote stability and support among the population.
As for Coalition military operations, the next course of action was Operation Anaconda, which was to attack Taliban and al Qaeda holdings in Southeast Afghanistan. The assault was to take place in Shah-i-Kot Valley, which much like many parts of Afghanistan, was very mountainous; there are no clear roads or trails to get anywhere, altitude is pushed up to 11,000 feet in some places, and al Qaeda had dug into the region with many caves. The weather was not harsh (compared to Afghanistan’s climate), but there was still snow at the higher elevations and rain down below, with temperatures going no higher than 60 degrees Fahrenheit and going as low as 20. Coalition electronic equipment was hindered due to the weather and caves had to be found the hard way, with ground infantry finding them by feeling around. In an interview with Field Artillery magazine, Major General Hagenbeck, who was in charge of American forces during the operation, stated that the environment was one of the factors that made fighting in Afghanistan so difficult (another being absolute darkness at night). The low visibility gave few targets for Coalition forces, and that made it difficult for air attacks to be effective. There was also the issue of not knowing cave contents; it turned out that many caves lacked insurgents, and that air strikes could have destroyed important documents or ammunition left behind by the Taliban. At this point in the fighting, many insurgents were surrendering and the only enemy that wanted to fight were hardened combat veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion, even defeating the Soviets in the same valley twice. Coalition forces were able to overcome the enemy with the use of mortars and machine guns, both of which were able to suppress enemy fighters and stop them from retreating back into the caves. Concluding his interview, General Hagenbeck gives an analysis of what he learned in Operation Anaconda about what is needed for tactical combat in climates like Afghanistan’s: all-weather equipment for both ground forces and artillery; long range communications for long range deployment and high altitudes, along with tactical satellites; training for observers for more precise calling for air support and artillery; operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) “sitting next to the tactical commander.” <McElroy, Robert. "Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda." Field Artillery, September 2002. 5-9.>
Despite repeated Coalition successes, peace was not a possibility in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, who later became president, had little to no support outside Kabul; despite being a Pashtun, he was still seen as an imposed foreign puppet who was to impose foreign values onto his own people. The Pashtuns even blamed the Afghan Transitional Authority for a lack of representation and for human rights abuses. <Taddeo, Valentina. "U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign." Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (2010): 28-29.> The deposed Taliban remained determined to remove the Coalition forces, who they saw as simply more foreign invaders. With disgruntled Pashtuns, the Taliban would have the backbone to build an insurgency to pursue their agenda. The Pashtuns offer support to the Taliban insurgency by “[providing] superb real-time intelligence on most troop movements, allowing Taliban fighters to flee when outnumbered or to set-up ambushes” when it seemed like a better option than just a simple attack. <Afsar,Samples, & Wood. 64> Besides ethnic support from the Pashtuns, the Taliban had other resources to pull from. One major resource is support from fundamentalist Islamic factions (alignment with al Qaeda made this possible) such as the Pakistani Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi and other organizations from Uzbekistan and East Turkestan; since Islamic fundamentalism was claimed to be a driving idea against the Soviet invasion, Muslim “symbols” such as madrassas became signs of freedom and victory over foreigners. Another resource is drug money. Ironically, the Taliban had designs to eliminate the production and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan, but with constant fighting and the need for money and favors, anyone in the country is susceptible to aiding opium farmers and drug traffickers.
A poorly planned US long-term strategy also contributed in the 2003-2005 successes of the Taliban insurgency; in 2003, President Bush made the decision to invade Iraq with the goal of overthrowing their dictator and disarming “weapons of mass destruction”. Believing that an elected president would stabilize Afghanistan, there was very little consideration of any insurgency trouble, and the US began to divert resources, manpower, and attention away from the region. Due to this, counterinsurgency efforts were hurt. The military activity that did happen in Afghanistan were simply a sequence of raids against al Qaeda, but there was no true focus on stabilizing the government or protecting the people. One of the motives for the insurgency was that the new Afghan government was seen as too weak and too corrupt to do anything. Poor security, a poor economy, and strong tribal rivalries are what made instability even worse, thus contributing to insurgent advantage. <Taddeo 29-30>
The involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Afghanistan took the form of the International Security Assistance Force, an organization formed by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001. Originally, ISAF was tasked to securing Kabul and aiding the construction of the new Afghan regime, while command rotated between lead nations. But in 2003, under UN Resolution 1510, ISAF involvement became extended to the rest of the country, with command being given to NATO (this is the first operation outside Europe done by NATO). <United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1510, 2003.> In 2003, about 40,000 Coalition forces were placed under NATO (ISAF) command, with a combination of duties ranging from security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. The tasks for ISAF are listed as: 1. Protecting the Afghan people. 2. Neutralize insurgent networks. 3. Develop the Afghan National Security Forces. 4. Promote effective governance and supporting socio-economic development. A major emphasis is given to “mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Security Forces.”
<"Topic: NATO's role in Afghanistan." NATO - Homepage. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed March 10, 2011).> ISAF’s mission was divided into four stages, where the organization was to accomplish its tasks in a different region of Afghanistan during each one. Stage one was implemented in the northern end of the country, and lasted from August 2003 to October 2004; stage two occurred in the west, and was declared to be complete in September 2005; stage three sent ISAF to the south, and that phase was finished July 2006; operations for the entire country was what stage four was about, and that was finished in October 2006. Despite progress by ISAF, however, the insurgency is still resolute. The south has a parallel Taliban government that the region’s population submits to, and the insurgency’s resources continue to allow them mobility, power, and financing. Coalition troops in the south have the disadvantage of having little local support, although the Taliban’s supporters are motivated by fear rather than loyalty. <Taddeo 31> The republican government itself has little support from the people, who see it as failing to address the problems of poverty, opium with rising crime, unemployment, water shortage, and insurgent attacks. As long as those issues are not addressed, insurgency (even if not from al Qaeda or Taliban) will continue to be an issue. <Rubin, Barnett. “Saving Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs v. 86 no. 1 (January/February 2007)>
Late in 2003, a number of actions was taken by the US military to improve local support: first, there was an increase in Afghan cultural experts to help ground forces gain the confidence of the population. Next was the decrease in air strikes, as a recurring problem was that Afghan civilians were being caught in the attacks, hurting local support. Ground forces began to take a larger role in the fighting. However, when the United States began to take a more active role in ground military operations, it became easier for the Taliban to paint them as an occupying invader, and that the republic government was merely a puppet regime. <Taddeo 30> Residents interviewed by Foreign Affairs in 2006 showed anger and frustration from the people thanks to constant insurgent attacks and government corruption. A Kandahar resident explained that the Taliban is still very cruel to the people, but the neither the government nor ISAF give sufficient protection. In fact, the government punishes citizens for giving insurgents food despite them being coerced to do so, adding to the loss of trust in the regime. <Rubin>
In February 2007, President Bush announced that more US soldiers would be sent to Afghanistan to support military operations. As of June 2008, there was about 48,285 American soldiers in Afghanistan, with an increase spike of 16,000 the month before, and over 10,000 are reserves. This nearly doubles the number from the previous year, 26,480. <O’Bryant, JoAnne and Michael Waterhouse. US Forces for Afghanistan. Congressional Research Service.> 2008 Senator Barrak Obama was then elected to the Presidency, and implemented the troop surge proposals of his predecessor. In August 2009, the new president approved of Bush’s plan to send 17,000 more soldiers and in December announced that an additional 30,000 American soldiers would be sent to aid combat operations in Afghanistan with a plan to begin withdrawing in July 2011. <Taddeo 32> Despite the withdrawal plan, the Obama administration seems to be in agreement with Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Wardak that US military involvement will continue past 2014. Even if military forces are withdrawn earlier, there would still be American participation (this was unspecified). <Google. "AFP: Afghanistan seeks US help post-2014." Google. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQ8pEKdW7a9DN2zru5bMEUdjaIfQ?docId=CNG.500422060628702d0c7179bcd0174e76.361 (accessed March 21, 2011).> An issue with US policy is certainly how many soldiers would be enough. To that end, the RAND Corporation, an non-profit institution dedicated to improved policymaking, provided analysis on what is acceptable. Citing the manuals of the US Army and US Marine Corps, the recommended minimum number of soldiers needed for counterinsurgency is 20 for every 1,000 population. As of April 2009, Afghanistan’s population was estimated as 13,582,600, which would require a military population of 271,652. This does not mean that the US should sent that many troops, or that any other NATO member or foreign country to meet that number. In fact, it is important for Afghan forces (police and military) to have a large fraction of the recommended manpower, and that this is necessary more so in recent times with the Afghan people loosing confidence in Coalition forces to stabilize the country. Another detail is that in a nation like Afghanistan, it is essential to include local tribal forces in military operations versus total reliance on national forces; local warlords would be willing to help if they are not expected to fold to the authority of Kabul. <Jones, Seth. “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan”. Testimony by RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation April 2009. 7-10>
The are many factors that make up the insurgent problem in Afghanistan, so it cannot be labeled so easily. The most obvious and well known factions are al Qaeda and the deposed Taliban. The former, formally established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988, has its roots in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with an international military brigade dedicated to fighting against the Soviets. After Soviet withdrawal, Bin Laden continued to recruit more fighters and financed weapons dealing and training with the desire to rid the Muslim world of “western influence”. Al Qaeda has fighters from over fifty countries, and they live by extremist views of Sunni Islam, planning to impose that extremism in Muslim nations. Although Bin Laden is considered to be the head of the organization, al Qaeda is not a single unified organization with a capital base or direct command. Instead, numerous cells operate independently in different parts of the world and they meet in a council to discuss possible operations. Ever since the overthrow of the republican government and the establishment of the Islamic Emirate, Afghanistan has been a main base for al Qaeda with the consent of the Taliban, with occasional action in Pakistan. But after the fall of the Emirate, many operatives have relocated to war-torn Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where Bin Laden has the opportunity to spread his message to local tribes and find new recruits. <"al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida) - Council on Foreign Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126 (accessed March 8, 2011).>
The Taliban was also formed after the failed Soviet invasion, as a reactionary force to reverse progressivism introduced by the previous regimes of the Democratic Republic (communist government) and the Islamic State (republic). Being mostly Pashtun, that culture has a strong influence on attitudes and behaviors, including the strong militant stance against foreign invaders brought on by generations of resisting occupiers, from the “Great Game”, to the Soviet Union, to NATO today. Other than religion, Pashtun interests are desired in policy, and much Taliban fervor comes from the feeling of being marginalized by the rest of Afghanistan’s minority ethnic groups. <Afsar,Samples, & Wood, 59-60> Organization has changed since the fall of the Emirate: while in power, structure was very centralized. After becoming an insurgency force, operatives have split up and commanders are given more authority to make decisions in wherever in the country they are. This makes for greater direct tactical command, and this kind of independence makes it easy for non-aligned militia to gain membership and recognition from the Taliban. The separate cells run their “own intelligence collection, logistics, and population-control activities with coordination and support from other cells.” There is even collaboration with other Taliban cells to exchange support. <Afsar 64-66> Tactics used by Taliban insurgents (and al-Qaeda) include guerilla warfare, and their knowledge of the rough Afghan terrain makes them able to force Coalition forces to spread out in large rural areas. Meanwhile, insurgents would find shelter from local populations, whether by consent or by coercion. <Afsar 68> Much like al Qaeda, the Taliban’s ideology is drawn from an extreme form of Sunni Islam, and the Emirate regime is known to have been very repressive and brutal. Because of this, the Taliban was, and is, unpopular with the Afghan people. The ideology of behind the Taliban was so extreme and so out of line with the majority of Muslims that support was very minority, but this was compensated for by instilling fear into the population. No other form of Islam was extreme and reactionary enough for the Taliban. <Afsar 61> In April 2009, when residents of Kabul were asked by ABC who was the biggest threat to them, nearly sixty percent answered the Taliban. RAND elaborates: “It’s not difficult to see why... The objective of senior Taliban leaders is to establish an extreme version of sharia (Islamic law) across the country... the Taliban closed cinemas and banned music, along with almost every other conceivable kind of entertainment... In Kabul, the Taliban carried out brutal punishments in front of large crowds in the former soccer stadium.” <Jones, 3-4>
Other armed forces in Afghanistan that can threaten ISAF operations include tribal warlords who are becoming more autonomous now that the Taliban is out of power, smaller fundamentalist groups that are not exactly aligned with the Taliban or al Qaeda, and criminal forces such as drug traffickers and smugglers. The instability of the country has also led to other groups with agendas of their own migrating into the area. The increase of faction activity makes the situation very complex; it is no longer a simple matter of ISAF against terrorists and terrorist allies, but now the inclusion of so many other third parties that have no original involvement or desire to be involved in the conflict. There are also cases of collaboration between parties, “...drug traffickers have developed close links with both insurgent groups and government officials in moving drugs along cross-border routes. Tribes and sub-tribes have collaborated with insurgent groups in rural areas of the country, sometimes changing sides depending on whether the Afghan government and NATO forces are able to clear and hold territory.” <Jones 2-3> The drug trade is especially important to examine, as Afghanistan is the primary producer of opium, and the profit of the trade makes any force look beyond ideology, alignment, and religion. When the Taliban was in power, they pushed to stop the opium trade. But now, most opium production occurs in south Afghanistan, where the Taliban is also the strongest, and that gives major financial backing. As of 2008, the opium industry made up more than half of Afghanistan’s economy, and the Taliban collected $15 million in profits from one district alone. <“Afghanistan's Deadly Opium Harvest” Al Jazzera English. Host Nick Clark. Original Broadcast May 3 2009.> As of 2007, the total heroin output from Afghanistan made up ninety-three percent of the world’s entire production. <“Opium Wars” Journeyman Pictures. Original Broadcast April 2008.> One of the main reasons for opium production and trafficking being inherent is local necessity; the social strain placed on local farmers is so strong that it is a means of survival. Smugglers offer protection to farmers and place them into debt that they must pay off with massive opium harvests. In an interview with Al Jazzera English, a farmer in Badakstan uses an analogy to explain his dilemma: “In Islam, if you are dying of hunger you are allowed to eat pork. We think of opium as worse than pork, but we are growing it because we are desperate.” <“Afghan Farmers Growing Poppies to Survive”. Al Jazeera English. Host James Bays. Original Broadcast Aug 27 2007.> While he grows wheat and sweet potatoes to feed his family, the money from opium (although he makes little profit, as most of it goes to smugglers) is vital to send his children to school. Without the money, he worries that his children have no future. US Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood discussed with Journeyman Pictures the effect of the drug trade has on ISAF and Afghan government, “Drug production undermines rule of law. If fuels corruption, it discourages private investment, it undermines governance, it creates violence and instability; when the drug traffickers and the Taliban are collaborating they collaborate effectively. But when they are actually just working independently they are both going after the same aims...”. Counternarcotics efforts are strongly hindered; with task forces being so underpaid (about $60 a month for police chiefs) it is easy to find a huge bribe to have them abandon duty. However, the Taliban is still able to use the government’s stance against the drug trade to find backing from opium growers. <Rubin> The Council on Foreign Relations discussed with CBS the severity of corruption in Kandahar, where the brother of the Afghan president has even been accused of collaborating with the drug trade. (He died not too long ago) Family members of the Karzais have been accused of laundering drug money to the Taliban by the US trained Major Crimes Task Force, and the president responded by trying to ban the group in August 2010. <“Overcoming Corruption in Afghanistan”. CBS. Original Broadcast Aug 29 2010.>
As for improving the situation, there is certainly a lot of ground to cover. Gaining the trust of the Afghan people is a crucial one, but for that to happen many issues need to be addressed first. It is important to understand that the people are not biased against the US or ISAF; Afghans do not wish to give up the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Rather, they feel as if no one on their side, thanks to government corruption and constant insurgent trouble. <Rubin> Dealing with corruption can gain a huge step when the drug trade is dealt with, but this will be difficult considering the low wages of government employees ($60 a month for police chiefs, as mentioned earlier. Let that sink in.), thus making them vulnerable to bribes. The local farmers need to be helped off opium, as well. I truly believe that when they no longer need the “protection” of traffickers or the support of the Taliban, and have other means to afford necessities such as school for children, social strain to resort to opium will decrease. Al Jazeera even reported that in northern Afghanistan as of 2009, wheat is starting to become the primary crop thanks to the price of wheat increasing greatly, as well as having a more peaceful region, and public information campaigns. <“Afghanistan's Deadly Opium Harvest”>
More effort must go into rebuilding the country, and by Afghanistan’s own unique needs. The ethnic and cultural differences combined with tribal militia make it a folly to focus on Kabul, as was the actual case immediately after liberation, and depend on that to be a catalyst for the nation to recover. After the Taliban’s fall, tribal autonomy grew, hindering Kabul’s hold. Due to great differences among the tribes and Kabul, any efforts Kabul makes are at risk of being rejected outside the capital. <Dorronsoro 331-332> Because reconstruction efforts were not enough, the government has remained weak outside of the capital, and tribal militias still operate on their own terms to ensure their survival, even if it means working with drug traffickers and the insurgency. If the Afghan economy can grow and increase income per capita, and the tribal militia cooperated with reconstruction, central power can increase thus building stability and a stronger military to aid against insurgency. <Rubin>
As for military operations, that can be helped with both the stabilizing of the government and cooperation with local tribes. Strengthening the government (and fighting corruption) will increase capability of the Afghan National Army to protect the people under influence of Kabul. This will help the population feel confident that the government and ISAF can ensure their safety and welfare against insurgents, so they will feel less inclined to cooperate with the Taliban and their allies. <Taddeo 33-34> Tribes are once again crucial; they must be counted to help in fighting insurgents, as was mentioned earlier. The ANA cannot cover the entire country, and Afghanistan has no history of political and military unity. In Afghanistan’s more peaceful years under the monarchy (I am biased, but this is NOT an opinion), the king had a competent and capable security force that “... was established using a combination of Afghan national forces – police, military, and intelligence – and local [tribal] entities.” <Jones, 7-8> Tribal militias that work with ISAF are militias that don’t help the insurgency.
Establishing a successful policy in Afghanistan is clearly a challenge as the list of problems is quite extensive. The insurgency must be dealt with, but how would ISAF deal with all the other militant groups and drug traffickers? If the Afghan government is to stabilize and support itself, how can corruption be dealt with? How can the US and ISAF gain the support of the population and tribal factions? How much longer will operations in Afghanistan be? These issues are related so they all must be addressed; if one remains a problem, then any other improvements will be futile, and dealing with one at a time will be wasting time and money. Future considerations are also important, as US policy during the 1979 Soviet invasion had unintended consequences that may have led to US action in Afghanistan today. With all this in mind, it is hard to see if there is any hope for the Central Asian country as too many things have gone wrong. If things do not improve, who knows how much longer US involvement will be. "
Works Cited
The 9/11 Commission report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.. New York: Norton, 2004.
"Terrorism - Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy." CDI - Center for Defense Information - Security Policy Research Organization. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm (accessed March 2, 2011).
"Topic: NATO's role in Afghanistan." NATO - Homepage.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed March 10, 2011).
"The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed March 1, 2011).
"al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida) - Council on Foreign Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126 (accessed March 8, 2011).
Taddeo, Valentina. "U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign." Journal of Strategic Security v3, no. 2 (2010)
“Opium Wars” Journeyman Pictures. Original Broadcast April 2008.
Note: Video was found on the channel “journeymanpictures” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33hOWlGX4OQ (accessed March 5, 2011)
“Afghanistan's Deadly Opium Harvest” Al Jazzera English. Host Nick Clark. Original Broadcast May 3 2009.
Note: Video was found on the channel “AlJazeeraEnglish” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TWy7ZScURU (accessed March 5, 2011)
“Afghan Farmers Growing Poppies to Survive”. Al Jazeera English. Host James Bays. Original Broadcast Aug 27 2007.
Note: Video was found on the channel “AlJazeeraEnglish” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwyoq6CrflQ (accessed March 5, 2011)
“Overcoming Corruption in Afghanistan”. CBS. Original Broadcast Aug 29 2010.
Note: Video was found on the channel “CBS” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPY2_twiJ3M&feature=fvst (accessed March 5, 2011)
McElroy, Robert. "Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda." Field Artillery, September 2002. 5-9
Google. "AFP: Afghanistan seeks US help post-2014." Google.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQ8pEKdW7a9DN2zru5bMEUdjaIfQ?docId=CNG.500422060628702d0c7179bcd0174e76.361 (accessed March 21, 2011).
Dorronsoro, Gilles. "Return to Political Fragmentation." In Revolution Unending: Afghanistan:1979 to the Present. London: Columbia University Press, 2005.
Afsar, Shahid, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood. "The Taliban, An Organizational Analysis." Military Review (2008): 58-71.
Rubin, Barnett. “Saving Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs v. 86 no. 1 (January/February 2007) No page numbers given.
Jones, Seth. “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan”. Testimony by RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation April 2009. 7-10
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1510, 2003.
What is also necessary to learn are lessons from the debacle in Afghanistan. To that end, I would like to make a contribution: my own term paper from when I was an undergrad, assessing the tactical and strategic situations there from 2001 to the present (which was 2011 when I did this). Each paragraph tackles a different topic, from US used tactics on the battlefield, to Afghanistan's background, to modern history, to NATO goals and accomplishments, to current problems facing the country. I'm no Dr. Walt and by no means a professional analyst, so by all means blow all of this off if you think I'm full of it. I don't know why you would be reading my blog if you thought I was, though.
Oh, and this was written right before Bin Laden was supposedly wasted, so expect inaccuracies.
(Bold italics in parenthesis are comments I am adding right here on the blog.)
" Whenever any policymaker considers any type of operation in Afghanistan, it is important to know that the nation has a lot of attributes that contribute to instability: The people of the country are ethnically and linguistically divided, there is a history of struggle against European influence that lasted about one hundred years (and included three wars), drug trafficking is a major problem, and the country has been in civil war since the failed Soviet invasion. It really appears that nothing seems to go right for Afghanistan. There are even signs of struggle from the United States military. It has been almost ten years since Operation EnduringFreedom was launched, and since then there have been plenty of raids, military offensives by both US military and Taliban insurgents, tension involving neighboring nations (namely Pakistan), and American troop surges. Things do not appear to be any more stable than when Western involvement in Afghanistan began; insurgency is still a problem, the deposed Taliban is still determined as ever, opium trafficking is rampant, local support is falling, and the American-backed regime is a hot bed of corruption. This essay will examine topics ranging from the cultural and political environment of Afghanistan, US policy during the Soviet invasion, earlyUS objectives and tactical analysis during Operation Enduring Freedom, the increase of insurgency and US response (NATO involvement, troop surges, etc.), the background of insurgent forces and other threats, to what (if anything) can be done to see improvement.
Afghanistan has a gloomy background that builds upon its instability and militant culture, and this is something policymakers need to consider, no matter the operation. The ethnic makeup is very diverse, with Pashtuns making up the majority with forty-two percent of the population, Tajiks taking up twenty-seven percent, Hazaras and Uzbeks having nine percent each, and Aimaks, Turkmen, Baloch and other minorities filling in the remaining thirteen percent. Language is also very divided; though there is plenty of multilingualism, a fifty percent majority speak Dari Persian with Pashto speakers taking thirty-five percent of the population. <"The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed March 1, 2011).> The Pashtuns in particular, who mostly inhabit the western and southern regions of the county, have a brutal history of war and resisting outsiders. The country’s location has attracted the eye of many foreign invaders; being right in the middle of the Asian continent, it is something of a crossroads in between India, the Middle East, East Asia, and Russia along with the former Soviet republics. Therefore, it is a land of strategic importance to anyone trying to obtain dominance in Asia. For virtually all the 19th Century, Russia and Great Britain - while competing for control in Central Asia - kept Afghanistan under influence in a period known as “The Great Game”. This lasted until the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, when Afghanistan finally gained political sovereignty. While Afghanistan has not had an easy road to independence, the Pashtuns have always been fierce in resistance. With every invader, they have always put up a fight and learned to adapt against any outside threat, and are unlikely to tolerate foreign presence in their lands as a result of all the bloody imperialist history. <Afsar, Shahid, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood. "The Taliban, An Organizational Analysis." Military Review (2008): 59>
In 1979, the Soviet Union sent armed forces into Afghanistan to aid the communist state in power at the time against the mujahideen, who were determined to impose their strict religious values. The United States responded to this by sending aid to the insurgents, including lots of money and weapons purchased from China. The Soviets could not overcome the American supplied and financed insurgents, and withdrew from Afghanistan, their campaign a failure. After driving out the Soviets, the communist regime in Kabul was then overthrown and replaced with a weak republican government. Without strong leadership and the tribal factions remaining divided, the country plunged deeper into civil war. The US, however, cut off most rebuilding aid by 1989, leaving Afghanistan a ruined country with people in poverty and fighters who were still
armed. A few years later, many of the US-backed mujahideen joined with fundamentalist forces to establish the Taliban, which overthrew the weak republic and took power as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Much of what the US had given the Afghans had become assets for the Taliban to pursue their militant Islamic agenda. The Pashtuns, seeing an ideology that would be a strong preserver of their Islamic way of life, found the Taliban to be promising, and thus became the majority group of the movement. <Afsar 60> The weak central leadership that has plagued Afghanistan for decades was finally filled by the Taliban, and that sign of unity appealed to more mujahideen and tribes, who began to align with the Emirate in greater numbers. The extremist regime was terrorist-friendly enough to become a safe haven for other Islamic militants, including Osama Bin Laden. <“Terrorism - Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy." CDI - Center for Defense Information - Security Policy Research Organization. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-history.cfm (accessed March 2, 2011).> Bin Laden and his terrorist organization al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a vital resource: “Bin Laden appeared to have in Afghanistan a freedom of movement that he had lacked in Sudan. Al Qaeda members could travel freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any information procedures, purchase and import vehicles and weapons, and enjoy the use of official Afghan Ministry of Defense license plates.” <The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004. 66> In time, enough pieces were in place to allow Bin Laden to pull off the fateful terrorist attack in New York City on September 11th, 2001. After this attack, Washington responds accordingly with Operation Enduring Freedom.
In preparing for action against al Qaeda, President George W. Bush gathered his “War Council” and formulated the public policy on what to do: to attack terrorism around the world, as well as any nations who harbor them. What this meant for Afghanistan is that the ruling Taliban would be held accountable for aiding al Qaeda, and would come under fire as well. US strategy in Afghanistan also included diplomacy; Afghanistan neighbor Pakistan was known to support the Taliban, but not al Qaeda. A list of steps to assist US operations was given to the Pakistani government, including to allow the US usage of Pakistani territory, publicly denouncing terrorism, and stopping supply shipments to Afghsnitan. Pakistan agreed to all demands, as the alternative was to become another suspect in supporting terrorism. <Commission report 331> With Pakistan’s cooperation, President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began discussing what to do with the Taliban. The policy that was formulated (with help from the State Department), would put pressure on the Taliban to fold to US demands; the leaders of Afghanistan would be given a range from twenty-four to forty-eight hours to turn over Bin Laden and his lieutenants to the US as well as “[to] tell the United States what the Taliban knew about al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply with UN Security Council resolutions.” Policymakers did not expect the Taliban to fold. <332> Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet proposed using the CIA to work with anti-Taliban warlords to enlist their help in fighting al Qaeda, and military officials drew up a campaign strategy based on the Pentagon’s “phased campaign” plan. Rumsfeld was tasked with ensuring American soldiers worldwide were safe from terrorist attacks, and the Treasury Department was to go after al Qaeda’s financial assets. By September 18, Powell found that there was enough international support for the US, with allies pledging aid in the form of medical services and search-and-rescue. The final draft of the anti-terrorist policy, titled “Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States”, included Bush’s proposal to count terrorist harboring nations as terrorists themselves and expanded strategy to become a worldwide “War on Terror”, not simply action against al Qaeda. The policy made it clear that “The United States would strive to eliminate all terrorist networks, dry up their financial support, and prevent them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” <333-334>
Operation Enduring Freedom was divided into four phases: In Phase One, American forces would move into the region around Afghanistan (such as neighboring countries) and begin to organize and plan attacks. Phase Two was when the CIA and Special Operations forces began working with anti-Taliban warlords, while air attacks were done against Taliban and al Qaeda targets. Phase Three saw the use of American ground forces in Afghanistan and active effort to overthrow the Taliban. By mid November, the Taliban abandoned Kabul to American and anti-Taliban Afghan forces, and by December all major cities were liberated. One of the main perpetrators of the 9/11 attack, Mohammed Atef, was killed in an air strike. Tora Bora, an important stronghold and cave network to al Qaeda, was cleared of all threats and captured as well (although Bin Laden was not captured). Finally, after a three week battle against al Qaeda, most militants fled into the mountains of Pakistan. The success was so rapid that it took less than a year to happen. Mutual cooperation with local forces is clearly a factor to the rapid success, as “... the CIA provided intelligence, experience, cash, covert action capabilities, and entree to tribal allies. In turn, the US military offered combat expertise, firepower, logistics, and communications.” However, work was not done; the fourth and final phase of the Coalition invasion was to redirect efforts for “security and stability operations.” <337-338> With the Taliban out of power, the country was renamed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The political body responsible for creating domestic policy, the loya jirga (Pashto for “great council), selected Hamid Karzai as leader, despite the council’s consensus of restoring the monarchy deposed in 1978. (American pressure stopped restoration) <Dorronsoro, Gilles. "Return to Political Fragmentation." In Revolution Unending: Afghanistan:1979 to the present. London: Columbia University Press, 2005. 330.> The new democratic regime was supposed to be ideal to promote stability and support among the population.
As for Coalition military operations, the next course of action was Operation Anaconda, which was to attack Taliban and al Qaeda holdings in Southeast Afghanistan. The assault was to take place in Shah-i-Kot Valley, which much like many parts of Afghanistan, was very mountainous; there are no clear roads or trails to get anywhere, altitude is pushed up to 11,000 feet in some places, and al Qaeda had dug into the region with many caves. The weather was not harsh (compared to Afghanistan’s climate), but there was still snow at the higher elevations and rain down below, with temperatures going no higher than 60 degrees Fahrenheit and going as low as 20. Coalition electronic equipment was hindered due to the weather and caves had to be found the hard way, with ground infantry finding them by feeling around. In an interview with Field Artillery magazine, Major General Hagenbeck, who was in charge of American forces during the operation, stated that the environment was one of the factors that made fighting in Afghanistan so difficult (another being absolute darkness at night). The low visibility gave few targets for Coalition forces, and that made it difficult for air attacks to be effective. There was also the issue of not knowing cave contents; it turned out that many caves lacked insurgents, and that air strikes could have destroyed important documents or ammunition left behind by the Taliban. At this point in the fighting, many insurgents were surrendering and the only enemy that wanted to fight were hardened combat veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion, even defeating the Soviets in the same valley twice. Coalition forces were able to overcome the enemy with the use of mortars and machine guns, both of which were able to suppress enemy fighters and stop them from retreating back into the caves. Concluding his interview, General Hagenbeck gives an analysis of what he learned in Operation Anaconda about what is needed for tactical combat in climates like Afghanistan’s: all-weather equipment for both ground forces and artillery; long range communications for long range deployment and high altitudes, along with tactical satellites; training for observers for more precise calling for air support and artillery; operators of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) “sitting next to the tactical commander.” <McElroy, Robert. "Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda." Field Artillery, September 2002. 5-9.>
Despite repeated Coalition successes, peace was not a possibility in Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai, who later became president, had little to no support outside Kabul; despite being a Pashtun, he was still seen as an imposed foreign puppet who was to impose foreign values onto his own people. The Pashtuns even blamed the Afghan Transitional Authority for a lack of representation and for human rights abuses. <Taddeo, Valentina. "U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign." Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (2010): 28-29.> The deposed Taliban remained determined to remove the Coalition forces, who they saw as simply more foreign invaders. With disgruntled Pashtuns, the Taliban would have the backbone to build an insurgency to pursue their agenda. The Pashtuns offer support to the Taliban insurgency by “[providing] superb real-time intelligence on most troop movements, allowing Taliban fighters to flee when outnumbered or to set-up ambushes” when it seemed like a better option than just a simple attack. <Afsar,Samples, & Wood. 64> Besides ethnic support from the Pashtuns, the Taliban had other resources to pull from. One major resource is support from fundamentalist Islamic factions (alignment with al Qaeda made this possible) such as the Pakistani Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi and other organizations from Uzbekistan and East Turkestan; since Islamic fundamentalism was claimed to be a driving idea against the Soviet invasion, Muslim “symbols” such as madrassas became signs of freedom and victory over foreigners. Another resource is drug money. Ironically, the Taliban had designs to eliminate the production and trafficking of opium in Afghanistan, but with constant fighting and the need for money and favors, anyone in the country is susceptible to aiding opium farmers and drug traffickers.
A poorly planned US long-term strategy also contributed in the 2003-2005 successes of the Taliban insurgency; in 2003, President Bush made the decision to invade Iraq with the goal of overthrowing their dictator and disarming “weapons of mass destruction”. Believing that an elected president would stabilize Afghanistan, there was very little consideration of any insurgency trouble, and the US began to divert resources, manpower, and attention away from the region. Due to this, counterinsurgency efforts were hurt. The military activity that did happen in Afghanistan were simply a sequence of raids against al Qaeda, but there was no true focus on stabilizing the government or protecting the people. One of the motives for the insurgency was that the new Afghan government was seen as too weak and too corrupt to do anything. Poor security, a poor economy, and strong tribal rivalries are what made instability even worse, thus contributing to insurgent advantage. <Taddeo 29-30>
The involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Afghanistan took the form of the International Security Assistance Force, an organization formed by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001. Originally, ISAF was tasked to securing Kabul and aiding the construction of the new Afghan regime, while command rotated between lead nations. But in 2003, under UN Resolution 1510, ISAF involvement became extended to the rest of the country, with command being given to NATO (this is the first operation outside Europe done by NATO). <United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1510, 2003.> In 2003, about 40,000 Coalition forces were placed under NATO (ISAF) command, with a combination of duties ranging from security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. The tasks for ISAF are listed as: 1. Protecting the Afghan people. 2. Neutralize insurgent networks. 3. Develop the Afghan National Security Forces. 4. Promote effective governance and supporting socio-economic development. A major emphasis is given to “mentoring, training and operational support to the Afghan National Security Forces.”
<"Topic: NATO's role in Afghanistan." NATO - Homepage. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed March 10, 2011).> ISAF’s mission was divided into four stages, where the organization was to accomplish its tasks in a different region of Afghanistan during each one. Stage one was implemented in the northern end of the country, and lasted from August 2003 to October 2004; stage two occurred in the west, and was declared to be complete in September 2005; stage three sent ISAF to the south, and that phase was finished July 2006; operations for the entire country was what stage four was about, and that was finished in October 2006. Despite progress by ISAF, however, the insurgency is still resolute. The south has a parallel Taliban government that the region’s population submits to, and the insurgency’s resources continue to allow them mobility, power, and financing. Coalition troops in the south have the disadvantage of having little local support, although the Taliban’s supporters are motivated by fear rather than loyalty. <Taddeo 31> The republican government itself has little support from the people, who see it as failing to address the problems of poverty, opium with rising crime, unemployment, water shortage, and insurgent attacks. As long as those issues are not addressed, insurgency (even if not from al Qaeda or Taliban) will continue to be an issue. <Rubin, Barnett. “Saving Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs v. 86 no. 1 (January/February 2007)>
Late in 2003, a number of actions was taken by the US military to improve local support: first, there was an increase in Afghan cultural experts to help ground forces gain the confidence of the population. Next was the decrease in air strikes, as a recurring problem was that Afghan civilians were being caught in the attacks, hurting local support. Ground forces began to take a larger role in the fighting. However, when the United States began to take a more active role in ground military operations, it became easier for the Taliban to paint them as an occupying invader, and that the republic government was merely a puppet regime. <Taddeo 30> Residents interviewed by Foreign Affairs in 2006 showed anger and frustration from the people thanks to constant insurgent attacks and government corruption. A Kandahar resident explained that the Taliban is still very cruel to the people, but the neither the government nor ISAF give sufficient protection. In fact, the government punishes citizens for giving insurgents food despite them being coerced to do so, adding to the loss of trust in the regime. <Rubin>
In February 2007, President Bush announced that more US soldiers would be sent to Afghanistan to support military operations. As of June 2008, there was about 48,285 American soldiers in Afghanistan, with an increase spike of 16,000 the month before, and over 10,000 are reserves. This nearly doubles the number from the previous year, 26,480. <O’Bryant, JoAnne and Michael Waterhouse. US Forces for Afghanistan. Congressional Research Service.> 2008 Senator Barrak Obama was then elected to the Presidency, and implemented the troop surge proposals of his predecessor. In August 2009, the new president approved of Bush’s plan to send 17,000 more soldiers and in December announced that an additional 30,000 American soldiers would be sent to aid combat operations in Afghanistan with a plan to begin withdrawing in July 2011. <Taddeo 32> Despite the withdrawal plan, the Obama administration seems to be in agreement with Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Wardak that US military involvement will continue past 2014. Even if military forces are withdrawn earlier, there would still be American participation (this was unspecified). <Google. "AFP: Afghanistan seeks US help post-2014." Google. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQ8pEKdW7a9DN2zru5bMEUdjaIfQ?docId=CNG.500422060628702d0c7179bcd0174e76.361 (accessed March 21, 2011).> An issue with US policy is certainly how many soldiers would be enough. To that end, the RAND Corporation, an non-profit institution dedicated to improved policymaking, provided analysis on what is acceptable. Citing the manuals of the US Army and US Marine Corps, the recommended minimum number of soldiers needed for counterinsurgency is 20 for every 1,000 population. As of April 2009, Afghanistan’s population was estimated as 13,582,600, which would require a military population of 271,652. This does not mean that the US should sent that many troops, or that any other NATO member or foreign country to meet that number. In fact, it is important for Afghan forces (police and military) to have a large fraction of the recommended manpower, and that this is necessary more so in recent times with the Afghan people loosing confidence in Coalition forces to stabilize the country. Another detail is that in a nation like Afghanistan, it is essential to include local tribal forces in military operations versus total reliance on national forces; local warlords would be willing to help if they are not expected to fold to the authority of Kabul. <Jones, Seth. “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan”. Testimony by RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, RAND Corporation April 2009. 7-10>
The are many factors that make up the insurgent problem in Afghanistan, so it cannot be labeled so easily. The most obvious and well known factions are al Qaeda and the deposed Taliban. The former, formally established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988, has its roots in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with an international military brigade dedicated to fighting against the Soviets. After Soviet withdrawal, Bin Laden continued to recruit more fighters and financed weapons dealing and training with the desire to rid the Muslim world of “western influence”. Al Qaeda has fighters from over fifty countries, and they live by extremist views of Sunni Islam, planning to impose that extremism in Muslim nations. Although Bin Laden is considered to be the head of the organization, al Qaeda is not a single unified organization with a capital base or direct command. Instead, numerous cells operate independently in different parts of the world and they meet in a council to discuss possible operations. Ever since the overthrow of the republican government and the establishment of the Islamic Emirate, Afghanistan has been a main base for al Qaeda with the consent of the Taliban, with occasional action in Pakistan. But after the fall of the Emirate, many operatives have relocated to war-torn Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where Bin Laden has the opportunity to spread his message to local tribes and find new recruits. <"al-Qaeda (a.k.a. al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida) - Council on Foreign Relations." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/al-qaeda-k-al-qaida-al-qaida/p9126 (accessed March 8, 2011).>
The Taliban was also formed after the failed Soviet invasion, as a reactionary force to reverse progressivism introduced by the previous regimes of the Democratic Republic (communist government) and the Islamic State (republic). Being mostly Pashtun, that culture has a strong influence on attitudes and behaviors, including the strong militant stance against foreign invaders brought on by generations of resisting occupiers, from the “Great Game”, to the Soviet Union, to NATO today. Other than religion, Pashtun interests are desired in policy, and much Taliban fervor comes from the feeling of being marginalized by the rest of Afghanistan’s minority ethnic groups. <Afsar,Samples, & Wood, 59-60> Organization has changed since the fall of the Emirate: while in power, structure was very centralized. After becoming an insurgency force, operatives have split up and commanders are given more authority to make decisions in wherever in the country they are. This makes for greater direct tactical command, and this kind of independence makes it easy for non-aligned militia to gain membership and recognition from the Taliban. The separate cells run their “own intelligence collection, logistics, and population-control activities with coordination and support from other cells.” There is even collaboration with other Taliban cells to exchange support. <Afsar 64-66> Tactics used by Taliban insurgents (and al-Qaeda) include guerilla warfare, and their knowledge of the rough Afghan terrain makes them able to force Coalition forces to spread out in large rural areas. Meanwhile, insurgents would find shelter from local populations, whether by consent or by coercion. <Afsar 68> Much like al Qaeda, the Taliban’s ideology is drawn from an extreme form of Sunni Islam, and the Emirate regime is known to have been very repressive and brutal. Because of this, the Taliban was, and is, unpopular with the Afghan people. The ideology of behind the Taliban was so extreme and so out of line with the majority of Muslims that support was very minority, but this was compensated for by instilling fear into the population. No other form of Islam was extreme and reactionary enough for the Taliban. <Afsar 61> In April 2009, when residents of Kabul were asked by ABC who was the biggest threat to them, nearly sixty percent answered the Taliban. RAND elaborates: “It’s not difficult to see why... The objective of senior Taliban leaders is to establish an extreme version of sharia (Islamic law) across the country... the Taliban closed cinemas and banned music, along with almost every other conceivable kind of entertainment... In Kabul, the Taliban carried out brutal punishments in front of large crowds in the former soccer stadium.” <Jones, 3-4>
Other armed forces in Afghanistan that can threaten ISAF operations include tribal warlords who are becoming more autonomous now that the Taliban is out of power, smaller fundamentalist groups that are not exactly aligned with the Taliban or al Qaeda, and criminal forces such as drug traffickers and smugglers. The instability of the country has also led to other groups with agendas of their own migrating into the area. The increase of faction activity makes the situation very complex; it is no longer a simple matter of ISAF against terrorists and terrorist allies, but now the inclusion of so many other third parties that have no original involvement or desire to be involved in the conflict. There are also cases of collaboration between parties, “...drug traffickers have developed close links with both insurgent groups and government officials in moving drugs along cross-border routes. Tribes and sub-tribes have collaborated with insurgent groups in rural areas of the country, sometimes changing sides depending on whether the Afghan government and NATO forces are able to clear and hold territory.” <Jones 2-3> The drug trade is especially important to examine, as Afghanistan is the primary producer of opium, and the profit of the trade makes any force look beyond ideology, alignment, and religion. When the Taliban was in power, they pushed to stop the opium trade. But now, most opium production occurs in south Afghanistan, where the Taliban is also the strongest, and that gives major financial backing. As of 2008, the opium industry made up more than half of Afghanistan’s economy, and the Taliban collected $15 million in profits from one district alone. <“Afghanistan's Deadly Opium Harvest” Al Jazzera English. Host Nick Clark. Original Broadcast May 3 2009.> As of 2007, the total heroin output from Afghanistan made up ninety-three percent of the world’s entire production. <“Opium Wars” Journeyman Pictures. Original Broadcast April 2008.> One of the main reasons for opium production and trafficking being inherent is local necessity; the social strain placed on local farmers is so strong that it is a means of survival. Smugglers offer protection to farmers and place them into debt that they must pay off with massive opium harvests. In an interview with Al Jazzera English, a farmer in Badakstan uses an analogy to explain his dilemma: “In Islam, if you are dying of hunger you are allowed to eat pork. We think of opium as worse than pork, but we are growing it because we are desperate.” <“Afghan Farmers Growing Poppies to Survive”. Al Jazeera English. Host James Bays. Original Broadcast Aug 27 2007.> While he grows wheat and sweet potatoes to feed his family, the money from opium (although he makes little profit, as most of it goes to smugglers) is vital to send his children to school. Without the money, he worries that his children have no future. US Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood discussed with Journeyman Pictures the effect of the drug trade has on ISAF and Afghan government, “Drug production undermines rule of law. If fuels corruption, it discourages private investment, it undermines governance, it creates violence and instability; when the drug traffickers and the Taliban are collaborating they collaborate effectively. But when they are actually just working independently they are both going after the same aims...”. Counternarcotics efforts are strongly hindered; with task forces being so underpaid (about $60 a month for police chiefs) it is easy to find a huge bribe to have them abandon duty. However, the Taliban is still able to use the government’s stance against the drug trade to find backing from opium growers. <Rubin> The Council on Foreign Relations discussed with CBS the severity of corruption in Kandahar, where the brother of the Afghan president has even been accused of collaborating with the drug trade. (He died not too long ago) Family members of the Karzais have been accused of laundering drug money to the Taliban by the US trained Major Crimes Task Force, and the president responded by trying to ban the group in August 2010. <“Overcoming Corruption in Afghanistan”. CBS. Original Broadcast Aug 29 2010.>
As for improving the situation, there is certainly a lot of ground to cover. Gaining the trust of the Afghan people is a crucial one, but for that to happen many issues need to be addressed first. It is important to understand that the people are not biased against the US or ISAF; Afghans do not wish to give up the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Rather, they feel as if no one on their side, thanks to government corruption and constant insurgent trouble. <Rubin> Dealing with corruption can gain a huge step when the drug trade is dealt with, but this will be difficult considering the low wages of government employees ($60 a month for police chiefs, as mentioned earlier. Let that sink in.), thus making them vulnerable to bribes. The local farmers need to be helped off opium, as well. I truly believe that when they no longer need the “protection” of traffickers or the support of the Taliban, and have other means to afford necessities such as school for children, social strain to resort to opium will decrease. Al Jazeera even reported that in northern Afghanistan as of 2009, wheat is starting to become the primary crop thanks to the price of wheat increasing greatly, as well as having a more peaceful region, and public information campaigns. <“Afghanistan's Deadly Opium Harvest”>
More effort must go into rebuilding the country, and by Afghanistan’s own unique needs. The ethnic and cultural differences combined with tribal militia make it a folly to focus on Kabul, as was the actual case immediately after liberation, and depend on that to be a catalyst for the nation to recover. After the Taliban’s fall, tribal autonomy grew, hindering Kabul’s hold. Due to great differences among the tribes and Kabul, any efforts Kabul makes are at risk of being rejected outside the capital. <Dorronsoro 331-332> Because reconstruction efforts were not enough, the government has remained weak outside of the capital, and tribal militias still operate on their own terms to ensure their survival, even if it means working with drug traffickers and the insurgency. If the Afghan economy can grow and increase income per capita, and the tribal militia cooperated with reconstruction, central power can increase thus building stability and a stronger military to aid against insurgency. <Rubin>
As for military operations, that can be helped with both the stabilizing of the government and cooperation with local tribes. Strengthening the government (and fighting corruption) will increase capability of the Afghan National Army to protect the people under influence of Kabul. This will help the population feel confident that the government and ISAF can ensure their safety and welfare against insurgents, so they will feel less inclined to cooperate with the Taliban and their allies. <Taddeo 33-34> Tribes are once again crucial; they must be counted to help in fighting insurgents, as was mentioned earlier. The ANA cannot cover the entire country, and Afghanistan has no history of political and military unity. In Afghanistan’s more peaceful years under the monarchy (I am biased, but this is NOT an opinion), the king had a competent and capable security force that “... was established using a combination of Afghan national forces – police, military, and intelligence – and local [tribal] entities.” <Jones, 7-8> Tribal militias that work with ISAF are militias that don’t help the insurgency.
Establishing a successful policy in Afghanistan is clearly a challenge as the list of problems is quite extensive. The insurgency must be dealt with, but how would ISAF deal with all the other militant groups and drug traffickers? If the Afghan government is to stabilize and support itself, how can corruption be dealt with? How can the US and ISAF gain the support of the population and tribal factions? How much longer will operations in Afghanistan be? These issues are related so they all must be addressed; if one remains a problem, then any other improvements will be futile, and dealing with one at a time will be wasting time and money. Future considerations are also important, as US policy during the 1979 Soviet invasion had unintended consequences that may have led to US action in Afghanistan today. With all this in mind, it is hard to see if there is any hope for the Central Asian country as too many things have gone wrong. If things do not improve, who knows how much longer US involvement will be. "
Works Cited
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Taddeo, Valentina. "U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign." Journal of Strategic Security v3, no. 2 (2010)
“Opium Wars” Journeyman Pictures. Original Broadcast April 2008.
Note: Video was found on the channel “journeymanpictures” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=33hOWlGX4OQ (accessed March 5, 2011)
“Afghanistan's Deadly Opium Harvest” Al Jazzera English. Host Nick Clark. Original Broadcast May 3 2009.
Note: Video was found on the channel “AlJazeeraEnglish” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TWy7ZScURU (accessed March 5, 2011)
“Afghan Farmers Growing Poppies to Survive”. Al Jazeera English. Host James Bays. Original Broadcast Aug 27 2007.
Note: Video was found on the channel “AlJazeeraEnglish” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kwyoq6CrflQ (accessed March 5, 2011)
“Overcoming Corruption in Afghanistan”. CBS. Original Broadcast Aug 29 2010.
Note: Video was found on the channel “CBS” on Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPY2_twiJ3M&feature=fvst (accessed March 5, 2011)
McElroy, Robert. "Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda." Field Artillery, September 2002. 5-9
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Rubin, Barnett. “Saving Afghanistan”. Foreign Affairs v. 86 no. 1 (January/February 2007) No page numbers given.
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United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1510, 2003.
Monday, March 19, 2012
Death and Succession.
The Kingdom of Tonga, the last Polynesian monarchy, has lost its king today. King George V of House Tupou passed away after being ill for several days. See details at the Royal Universe.
Best of luck to the new King, Tupoutoʻa Lavaka. May his reign be long and prosperous.
Best of luck to the new King, Tupoutoʻa Lavaka. May his reign be long and prosperous.
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